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RECENT DECISIONS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE JURY TRIALS AGAINST FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMMERCIAL CORPORATIONS
I. FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, administrators of two estates,1 brought a wrongful
death action 2 for damages arising out of the crash in Greece 3 of a
commercial airliner operated by defendant foreign governmentowned corporation. 4 Plaintiffs, claiming diversity jurisdiction,5 de-

manded a jury trial as granted by the seventh amendment. 6 Defendant, conceding jurisdiction, 7 moved to strike the demand for
a jury trial on the ground that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
1. Plaintiffs are the administrators of the estate of a husband and wife, both
citizens of Wisconsin, and of the estate of a citizen of New York.
2. The two original actions were consolidated for trial.
3. Decedents were passengers on defendant's plane, owned and operated as a
common carrier, when it crashed on a domestic flight between two Greek cities.
4. Defendant's stock is owned by the government of Greece. Defendant operates and has offices in the United States.
5. Plaintiffs based their claim of diversity jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2) (1976), as amended by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 3, 70 Stat. 289. Section 1332(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interests and costs, and is between1. citizens of different states;
2. citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
3. citizens of different states and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
4. a foreign state, defined in Section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a state or of different states.
6. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
7. Defendant originally contested jurisdiction and venue. It later conceded
both and also admitted liability for the accident.
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Act forbids jury trials in actions against foreign states." On defendant's motion to strike the demand for jury trial, motion denied.
Held: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not preclude
the right to trial by jury in actions against foreign governmentowned commercial corporations. Icenogle v. Olympic Airways,
S.A., No. 77-1982 (D.D.C. March 19, 1979).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The seventh amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in
civil actions previously recognized "at common law." The Framers included the amendment to safeguard against the arbitrary
application of the law10 in suits involving "legal" claims, defined
as those capable of satisfaction by an award of monetary damages.1 Traditionally, however, there is no right to trial by jury
against the United States government."2 Three factors account for
this prohibition of jury trials under the two major acts providing
for compensation of claims against the Government, 3 the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946 (FTCA) 14 and the legislation establishing
the Court of Claims."5 First, Congress was concerned with estab8. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in Section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
either under Sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See note 6 supra.
10. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
12. McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). "Any action against the
United States under section 1346 shall be tried to the court without a jury, except that any action against the United States under section 1346(a)(1) shall, at
the request of either party to such action, be tried by the court with a jury." 28
U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
13. Other procedures for compensation of claims exist. See, e.g., provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
14. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1976)).
15. See Act of March 3, 1887, Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505; Act of March 17, 1866,
Ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9; Act of March 3, 1863, Ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765; Act of February 24,
1855, Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; note 17 infra. Statutes governing the Court of
Claims are currently codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976).
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lishing procedures through which claims against the government
could be handled with greater speed and efficiency. Prior to the
establishment of the Court of Claims an aggrieved claimant's sole
remedy against the United States was a private congressional relief bill.1 6 Between 1855 and 1863, Congress, unable to consider
properly a large backlog of private relief bills, created the Court
of Claims to hear certain nonjury actions not sounding in tort
against the government. 17 Similarly, before the enactment of the
FTCA, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal district courts over civil actions for monetary damages arising out of
negligent acts or omissions by government employees,18 Congress
was only capable of handling fifteen to twenty percent of the meritorious relief bills presented to it. 9 Second, Congress desired to
ensure uniformity of decision in cases involving the government.
To foster the development of a coherent body of government procurement law, Congress vested sole jurisdiction in the Court of
Claims over contract suits against the United States with
amounts in controversy exceeding $10,000.20 Concern over the intrusion of political factors into the consideration of private tort
relief bills2" prompted Congress to enact the FTCA to ensure uniformity of decision between claims brought against the Government and suits brought against private defendants. Congress intended to make recovery against the United States a matter of

16. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 971 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Evans, The United States Court of Claims, 17 FED. BAR J. 85, 86-87
(1957). The Court of Claims' jurisdiction has been expanded to include "any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). For a
complete history of the Court of Claims, see Richardson, History, Jurisdiction,
and Practice of the Court of Claims of the United States, 7 SOUTHERN L. REV.
(new series) 52; reprinted in 17 Ct. Cl. 3 (1882); Hoyt, Legislative History of the
Court of Claims, in 1 WEST'S CT. CL: DIGEST at xiii (1950).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
19. Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,77th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1942) (memorandum for committee use).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976) allows the district courts to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims in contract and certain other actions in which less than $10,000 is in controversy. Evans, supra note 17, at 90,
97.
21. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 19, at 40.
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"justice" rather than of "grace" 22 by holding the sovereign liable
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 23 Third, Congress feared that juries, swayed by sentiment and the Government's inexhaustible resources, might render excessive verdicts in tort actions against the
United States.24 This apprehension resulted in the restriction of
the right to trial by jury against the Government to causes in
which damages can be precisely controlled. 25 Theoretical justification for the prohibition of jury trials is found in the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity. In McElrath v. United States26 the
Supreme Court approved nonjury trials in the Court of Claims by
holding that such suits are not controlled by the seventh amendment.27 The Court reasoned that because the Government could
22. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before A
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 50
(1940).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
24. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearing on H.R. 7326 Before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 20
(1940) (statement of A. Holtzoff). See also Anderson, Recovery from the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 31 MINN. L. REV. 456, 457 (1947).
25. In considering the Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 2(a), 68 Stat. 589 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976)), quoted at note 12 supra, which permitted taxpayers a greater opportunity to sue in the district courts for recovery of alleged
wrongfully collected taxes, Congress struck and then reinstated a provision allowing jury trials. "In either case [whether the tax collector or the government is
sued] recovery is limited to the amount of taxes erroneously or illegally collected." Congress wanted to eliminate in suits against a collector the legal fiction
that the collector personally paid any judgment against him. This consideration,
and the ability to control damages, outweighed any difficulties a jury might have
in applying complicated tax laws. H.R. REP. No. 2276, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEWS 2716, 2720-21.
Conversely, the Supreme Court consistently preserved the right to jury trial in
actions under statutes such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §
51 (1976), which gives injured railroad employees a cause of action against their
(private) employers, because of the jury's ability to find liability and damages
when a judge would have discerned neither. See Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 358 (1943) (Roberts, J., dissenting): "Finally I cannot
concur in the intimation which I think the opinion gives that, as Congress has
seen fit not to enact a workman's compensation law, this court will strain the
law of negligence to award compensation when the employer is without fault."
See also Schultz v. Pennsylvania Ry., 350 U.S. 523 (1956); Dice v. Akron, C. &
Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 600 (1952); Blair v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 323 U.S. 600 (1945).
26. 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
27. See also Franz Equipment Co. v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 622 (1952).
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be sued only with its consent under the prevailing theory of absolute sovereign immunity, Congress could impose conditions on the
privilege of suit, including the relinquishment of the right to jury
trial. Such suits were not "at common law within its true meaning."28 This rationale has been expressly extended to nonjury actions under the FTCA.29 Prior to the FTCA, only governmental
commercial corporations serving as agencies or instrumentalities
of the United States were amenable to suit and, thus, were within
the scope of the seventh amendment.3 0 In Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia,3 1 the Court explained the
reason for this divergent treatment:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes
a partner in any trading company it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen. [I]t descends to a level with
those whom it associates itself ....32
Under the FTCA, however, only those government corporations
not classified as agencies or instrumentalities 33 of the United
States are subject to trial by jury.3 Congress has the power to
28. 102 U.S. at 443. Further, the notion was advanced that the Court of
Claims was created pursuant to the Congress's power to pay debts, U.S. CONST.
art. I § 8, rather than the power to create inferior courts, U.S. CONST., art. III, §
1. E.g., U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941). To uphold Congress's declaration
that the Court of Claims was an article III court, Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253 §
1, 67 Stat. 226 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1976)), the Supreme Court abandoned the article I theory in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962). Additionally, the nonjury trial provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act were justified because when a district court heard such actions, it sat as a Court of Claims.
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 19, at 21 (statement
of F. M. Shea).
29. Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1961), also relied on
the idea that in such actions the courts sat under article I jurisdiction. See note
28 supra.

30. See Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S.S.B. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S.
549 (1922); Panama Ry. v. Minnix, 282 F. 47 (5th Cir. 1922).
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
32. Id. at 907.
33. As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2407(b) of this title,
the term "Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and
corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
34. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) and 28
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regulate the seventh amendment's coverage through its capacity
to characterize entities as "agencies" or "instrumentalities," and
35
thereby determine whether they are included under the FTCA.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 6 is an extension of the domestic solutions to similar problems in the international arena. The FSIA and the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which it codifies,3 7 are based upon the example of the
FTCA. The FSIA makes a foreign sovereign amenable to suit in
causes arising from a nation's private acts.38 Under the FSIA, a
nation's "private acts" encompass several classes of cases, 9 including those arising from its commercial activities.4 0 The FSIA's
primary purpose is to afford United States citizens a forum to
seek remedies against foreign states. To accomplish this objective
the Act vests in the courts the determination of pleas of sovereign
immunity, thereby removing State Department and international
political considerations. 41 Further, it makes a foreign state liable
for its private acts to the same extent a private party would be
under like circumstances.4 2 Section 1330, chapter 85, 28 U.S.C., as
added by the FSIA, grants the district courts original jurisdiction
in actions for monetary damages against foreign states held to be
amenable to suit.4 3 Section 1603 of the FSIA, as codified, defines
a "foreign state" to include any agency or instrumentality thereof,
or any foreign entity which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, a majority of which is owned by a foreign state and is
neither a citizen of a state of the United States nor created under

U.S.C. § 2671 (1976); Anderson, supra note 24, at 460-61.
35. For example, Congress has declared the National Rail Passenger Corporation not to be an agency or instrumentality. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1976). Similarly,
the Tennessee Valley Authority is specifically exempted from both the Court of
Claims' jurisdiction and the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 2680(1)
(1976).
36. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 289 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1976).
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605 (hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 941487). See Tate Letter, reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. at 984 (1952).
38. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at 7, 8, 14.
39. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605 (1976).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
41. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at 7.
42. Liability does not extend, however, to punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1606
(1976).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
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the law of a third country."" Foreign government-owned shipping
lines and airlines are thus considered "foreign states. '45 Since jurisdiction over foreign states is "comprehensively" treated under
section 1603, the FSIA amended section 1332 (a) (2) to delete diversity jurisdiction over "foreign states. '46 Federal district court
diversity jurisdiction over citizens or subjects of foreign states,
however, is retained. To "promote uniformity of decision where
foreign governments are involved, ' 48 the FSIA eliminates jury trials in both original" and removed actions. 50 To encourage the use
of the federal courts, and "in view of the potential sensitivity of
actions against foreign states,"5 1 the FSIA abolishes the amount
in controversy requirements in original and removed actions.52
The FSIA thus attempts to balance the interests of claimants and
foreign states by allowing claimants a more certain remedy while
granting foreign states opportunities such as nonjury trials and
easier removal of actions to federal courts.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case 53 the court faced novel questions regarding
conflict between the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the
seventh amendment. In concluding that the FSIA did not proscribe the right to jury trial against foreign government-owned
commercial corporations, the court examined thb changes effected
by the FSIA. First, the court noted that the FSIA eliminated diversity jurisdiction over foreign states but not over citizens or
subjects thereof. 54 Second, the court concluded that although de-

44. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976). For a discussion of recent decisions interpreting FSIA "ownership" requirements, see 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 165
(1979).
45. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at 16.
46. Id. at 14.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976); see note 5 supra.
48. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at 13.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976); see note 7 supra.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).

51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at 32.
52.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441 (1976). See R. B. von Mehren, The Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 44-45 (1978).
53. The instant opinion is reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 963
(1979).
54. Id. at 965-66. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
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fendant came within the FSIA's definition of a "foreign state,"5 5
the structure of the Act did not preclude diversity jurisdiction
over defendant. The court considered it significant that while jurisdiction over "foreign states" under section 1330 is cross referenced to that term's definition in section 1603, there is no such
reference between section 1332(a)(2) and 1603.56 The court reasoned that because the definition in section 1603 is limited by its
terms to chapter 97 of title 28 U.S.C., it is inapplicable to section
1332(a)(2), which is located in chapter 85. According to the
court, the effect of the FSIA's changes is "simply to subject some
foreign corporations owned by their governments to suit in a federal court under both Section 1330 and Section 1332(a)(2)." 5 8 The
court also found that prior to the passage of the FSIA the State
Department declined to recommend immunity for foreign government-owned air carriers. In light of this prior treatment, the court
stated that foreign-owned corporations should be considered "cit59
izens or subjects" rather than "foreign states" under the FSIA
and therefore are subject to both diversity jurisdiction and the
right to trial by jury. 0 In dicta, the court viewed both the attempt to constrict the right to trial by jury in previous cases and
the elimination of jury trials in removed actions as posing possible constitutional problems. 1 To avoid the constitutional issue
that might have been raised had Congress successfully eliminated
diversity jurisdiction over corporations such as defendant, the
court suggested that Congress may have intended the FSIA to apply to foreign states in their sovereign and political, rather than
their commercial, capacities. 2 The court recognized a further
constitutional difficulty as the instant action presents a "legal"
claim. The court reasoned that Congress, having removed immunity from foreign government commercial activities, may be una-

55. 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 963, 966 (1979).
56. Id. at 967.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 967, 968.
59. Id. at 964, 965, 969.
60. Id. at 970, 971.
61. Id. at 971, 972.
62. Id. It is, of course, more likely that a foreign state will challenge jurisdiction when its commercial acts become instruments of foreign policy. See Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); text accompanying note 82
infra.
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ble to restrict the constitutional right to jury trial. 3 Further, the
court found support for its position in its characterization of immunity as a "flexible principle of international comity" that,
when in conflict with the seventh amendment, must yield to the
constitutional mandate.14 Finally, the court noted that United
States government corporations have traditionally been subject to
suit in both tort and contract and that the FTCA exempts from
jury trial government corporations that act primarily as "agencies" or "instrumentalities" of the United States. 5 The court reasoned, therefore, that its decision holding that the FSIA does not
eliminate the right to jury trial in suits against foreign government-owned commercial corporations would further one of the
Act's primary purposes by equating the treatment of foreign
states with that accorded the United States."'
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision should serve to stimulate discussion on
both the theoretical justifications for and the practical implications of jury trials in actions against governmental defendants,
and therefore, may lead to revision of the FSIA. From a theoretical perspective, although the instant court correctly noted the
changes effected by the Act,67 it failed to perceive the full extent
of Congress' power in the domestic context. Congress, by its ability to classify entities as "agencies" or "instrumentalities" of the
United States, thereby exempting specific entities from the nonjury trial provisions of FTCA, has the power, in effect, to restrict
the scope of the seventh amendment in actions against the
United States."' Congress' ability to define the term "foreign
states" and thereby restrict the right to jury trial may also be
justified through its' power to regulate commerce with foreign
states.6 9 Further, the FSIA, although based on the restrictive the-

63.

18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs at 972-73.

64. Id. at 973, 974.
65. Id. at 974.
66. Id. at 974-75.
67. See text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
69. The Congress specifically invoked its powers to regulate foreign commerce, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to define offenses against the law of
nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 37, at
12.
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ory of sovereign immunity and purporting to make suits against
foreign states acting in their private capacities a matter of right,70
draws its nonjury trial provisions from the FTCA and Court of
Claims legislation. The amenability of the United States to suit in
tort and contract depends, however, on the absolute immunity
theory, under which the right of action is subject to sovereign
consent. 7 1 Thus the FSIA, although based on the restrictive theory, preserves, perhaps incorrectly, the absolute immunity theory's prohibitions against jury trials. From a practical perspective,
Congress considered the primary purpose of nonjury trials in actions against foreign states to be the need for decisional uniformity.72 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such uniformity is
attainable or desirable in cases heavily reliant upon factual determinations, such as presented in wrongful death or negligence actions. 73 Thus the impact of the jury on liability determination and
damage assessment, 74 a consideration important to the FTCA
framers but unarticulated by the FSIA authors, becomes the sole
rationale underlying the FSIA proscription of jury trials in such
suits. The possible impact of jury trials must be examined in light
of the theoretical justification for, and practical aspects of, diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is designed to prevent, or
to assuage fears of, partiality or prejudice on the part of state
courts and juries against nonresident parties.7 5 Though this rationale has been subject to much criticism, 7 6 the analogy to diversity
jurisdiction is valid in considering actions against foreign states in
United States courts. In diversity actions involving legal claims
between United States citizens in federal courts, the nonresident
77
party is guaranteed that all jurors will be United States citizens.

70. It is arguable that since actions against foreign states free from political
considerations require statutory authorization, they cannot be a matter of
"right."
71. See text accompanying notes 26-29, 33-35 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
73. See generally PROSSER, supra note 16, at 205-08.
74. The impact of the jury's possible sympathy for United States plaintiffs
on damage assessment may be less pronounced in actions in which damages can

be precisely controlled; unresolved, however, is the question of the impact of
possible jury bias on liability determination. See text accompanying notes 24-25
supra.
75.
76.

Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 86-87 (3d ed. 1976).

77.

28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1976).
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If, however, jury trials are permitted in actions against foreign
states or their entities, such defendants will face juries possibly
composed solely of unsympathetic United States citizens.7 8 This
probability must be evaluated in light of the ability and inclination of juries to find liability and award damages when a judge
would have discerned neither.7 9 Thus, it is arguable that diversity
jurisdiction is incapable of protecting from excessive verdicts foreign governmental defendants perceived as having inexhaustible
resources. Although courts may circumvent objectionable or excessive jury verdicts,80 defendant foreign governmental corpora-

tions may harbor doubts regarding the fairness of jury trials.81
This concern may have three effects. First, defendants may more
frequently contest United States jurisdiction due to fear of jury
trials. Second, because another factor in the result in the instant
case might have been the defendant's concession of jurisdiction,8 2
foreign government-owned corporations may be encouraged to
challenge United States courts' jurisdiction to obtain nonjury trials."' This may cause unnecessary use of both the courts' and the

78. This possibility is of course lessened when plaintiff is not a United States
citizen.
79. E.g., the impact of the jury in Federal Employer's Liability Act Cases;
see text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra.
80. Jury control devices include judgment n.o.v., directed verdict, motion for
new trial, and remittitur.
81. Note that foreign apprehensions regarding local prejudice may be more
important than the actual existence of such prejudice. See WRIGHT, supra note
76, at 91: "The key question is not whether out-of-state investors will receive
fair treatment from state courts, but whether they think they will."
82. See text accompanying note 7 supra. Although the court fails to discuss
this aspect of the case, see text accompanying notes 54-60 supra, defendant's
concession of jurisdiction may be another factor underlying the decision: Had
defendant contested jurisdiction the court might have classified defendant as a
"foreign state" under the FSIA, stopped its analysis at that point, and relied on
the nonjury trial provision of section 1330.
83. Note that according to the legislative history Congress may have intended the FSIA to apply only when foreign states challenge United States
court's jurisdiction. "[T]he 'Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976' sets
forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the
United States." H.R. REP. No. 74-1487, supra note 37, at 12 (emphasis added).
Thus, a defendant's concession of jurisdiction may result in jury trial in two
ways: It might be used, first, as in the instant case, see note 82 supra; second,
because it coincides with the legislative intent that the FSIA apply only upon a
foreign state's jurisdictional challenge. As mentioned, however, a defendant's ju-
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litigants' time and resources. Third, a defendant's concession of
jurisdiction or the inapplicability of section 1330 and the nonjury
trial provision contained therein may result in the unavailability
of other FSIA provisions, such as the eliminaton of prejudgment
attachment of foreign state property, 4 or in the frustration of one
of the Act's primary stated purposes, the development of a coherent body of law applicable to foreign states.8 5 These possible effects could have negative implications for the orderly trial of such
actions.8 6 Amendment of section 1332(a)(2) to limit diversity jurisdiction to those foreign entities of which less than a majority of
the shares are owned by foreign states would eliminate possible
problems arising from the use of jury trials.8 7 This would leave to
the courts only the constitutional question of the ability of Conrisdictional concession would avoid unnecessary litigation.
84. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976); text accompanying note 87 infra. Inapplicability of other FSIA provisions may result from the interdependence of Act
provisions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603(a), 1609-11 (1976).
85. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra. Note that in contrast to the
situation involving many tort actions, see text accompanying notes 72-74 supra,
decisional uniformity is still a valid ground for nonjury trial in most actions
involving foreign states.
86. For example, attachment of foreign state property not in accord with
FSIA provisions may cause foreign governments to request State Department
assistance which may reintroduce Department involvement in such suits. Elimination of such involvement was a major goal of the FSIA. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
87. Such an amendment to section 1332(a)(2) might provide for diversity jurisdiction between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,
provided, that such foreign citizens or subjects are not 'foreign states' as defined
in Section 1605(a)(b)(1-2) of this title." This change would effect the cross reference found lacking in the instant opinion. See text accompanying notes 56-57
supra.
Another possible difficulty in the wording of the FSIA appears in section
1330(a), note 8 supra. The language of the statute, -"the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction ...

of any nonjury civil action,"-can be interpreted

to make such actions dependent upon the district court's determination of
whether a party is entitled to a jury trial. This is clearly not the legislative intent; see text accompanying notes 36-42 supra. Such difficulties might be
avoided by redrafting section 1330(a) to read: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any civil action
against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim
for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under Sections 1605-07 of this title or under any applicable
international agreement. Such actions shall be tried by the court without a
jury."

Winter 1980]

RECENT DECISIONS

gress to define the term "foreign states" and thereby restrict the
seventh amendment. The reintroduction of jury trials may, however, not have the deleterious effects envisioned, for the benefits
flowing from the FSIA may outweigh the possible detriments of
jury trials. The Act's major benefits include the elimination of
two important foreign relations irritants, the State Department's
role in immunity determinations, and prejudgment attachment of
foreign government property."" The ability of courts to control or
circumvent jury verdicts also is a factor in this balance. Thus, the
issue of the impact and role of jury trials is crucial to the FSIA.
In order to preserve the usefulness of the right of action afforded
by the Act, future discussion and determination of the role of jury
trials in -suits against foreign states should focus on the impact of
jury trials on fairness to the parties, an essential goal of the seventh amendment. 9 The parties' faith in the fairness of the courts
is essential to their acquiescence to the courts' jurisdiction, rulings, and the orderly conduct of United States' international
relations.9 0
James M. Redwine

88. Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against ForeignStates: Hearingson
H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 28
(1976) (statement of M. Leigh).
89. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
90. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (challenge to personal jurisdiction): "[D]ue process requires only that...
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'"
A foreign governmental defendant's faith in the fairness of United States
courts is particularly important due to the defendant's sovereign character and
the lack of sanctions in international law. See W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-86 (1964).

